The long-term impact of employment bans on the economic integration of refugees by Marbach, Moritz et al.
  
Moritz Marbach, Jens Hainmueller and Dominik Hangartner 
The long-term impact of employment bans 
on the economic integration of refugees 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 Original citation: Marbach, Moritz and Hainmueller, Jens and Hangartner, Dominik (2018) The long-term impact of 
employment bans on the economic integration of refugees. Science Advances. ISSN 2375-2548 
(In Press) 
 
© 2018 American Association for the Advancement of Science 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/89809/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: August 2018 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
The long-term impact of employment bans on the
economic integration of refugees
Moritz Marbach,1,2 Jens Hainmueller,1,3,4,
∗
Dominik Hangartner1,2,5
1Immigration Policy Lab, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, and ETH Zurich, 8092 Zurich, Switzerland
2Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich, 8092 Zurich, Switzerland
3Department of Political Science, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305
4Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-6044
5Department of Government, London School of Economics, London WC2A 2AE, UK
∗To whom correspondence should be addressed; E-mail: jhain@stanford.edu.
1
Abstract:
Many European countries impose employment bans that prevent asylum seek-
ers from entering the local labor market for a certain waiting period upon ar-
rival. We provide evidence on the long-term effects of such employment bans
on the subsequent economic integration of refugees. We leverage a natural ex-
periment in Germany, where a court ruling prompted a reduction in the length
of the employment ban. We find that five years after the waiting period was re-
duced, employment rates were about 20 percentage points lower for refugees
who, upon arrival, had to wait an additional seven months before they were
allowed to enter the labor market. It took up to ten years for this employment
gap to disappear. Our findings suggest that longer employment bans consid-
erably slowed down the economic integration of refugees and reduced their
motivation to integrate early on after arrival. A marginal social cost analysis
for the study sample suggests that this employment ban cost German taxpay-
ers about 40 million Euro per year on average in terms of welfare expenditures
and forgone tax revenues from unemployed refugees.
Summary:
Temporary employment bans for asylum seekers have lasting negative conse-
quences for their economic integration.
Keywords:
asylum policy | refugee migration | economic integration | employment ban |
labor market
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Introduction
European countries are struggling with the largest refugee crisis since the aftermath of World
War II. Following steep increases in the number of people seeking refugee status in Europe,
policymakers face a major challenge in determining how best to integrate refugees and asylum
seekers into the host country’s economy and society (1). One of the most important issues
involves their access to the host country labor market (2–4). Policymakers face a dilemma: On
the one hand, given the costs of supporting refugees and asylum seekers after arrival, European
countries would benefit from rapidly integrating them into the local labor markets such that
they can start to work, become self-sufficient, and contribute to the local economy. On the other
hand, European governments are often reluctant to allow new asylum seekers to work given the
uncertainty about whether their asylum claims will be approved and political concerns that they
might displace native workers (5,6).
Most European governments have opted to require asylum seekers to wait before they are
allowed to enter the labor market (7, 8). As shown in Figure 1, there is considerable variation
in the required wait time across European countries, with most falling between six and twelve
months. The United States, Turkey, and other OECD countries outside Europe have imposed
similar employment bans on asylum seekers (1).
Proponents of employment bans often argue that letting asylum seekers access the labor
market effectively integrates them into the host society during the asylum process, making
deportation more difficult if their asylum claim is rejected. Work permission, they say, also
acts as a pull-factor and encourages even more people to apply for asylum (5, 6). In addition,
employment bans may be popular with voters who worry that asylum seekers and refugees take
away jobs from natives (9). Opponents argue that employment bans make it difficult for asylum
seekers and refugees to gain a footing in their host country. Forced into unemployment, asylum
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Figure 1: Minimum length of employment bans for asylum seekers in European countries
in 2016. There is considerable heterogeneity in the length of time asylum seekers have to
wait until they can access the labor market across Europe, ranging from the day of arrival (e.g.
Sweden) to an indefinite ban (Ireland). The median length across countries is 6 months. [Data
source: (1,8)]
seekers are in limbo until they can seek work. This can lead to lower motivation, depreciation of
human capital, and scarring, which might slow labor market integration for many years after the
waiting period is completed (10–12). Opponents also argue that this is costly for host societies,
which face higher welfare expenditures for unemployed asylum seekers and refugees and forgo
the tax contributions they would have made if employed.
Despite the importance of this issue, we have very limited evidence about how employment
bans affect asylum seekers and refugees. In fact, even though employment bans are in place
across Europe, we are not aware of any published study that has provided causal evidence
on the effects of waiting periods for accessing the labor market on the short- and long-term
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economic integration of refugees. Studying the effects of employment bans for asylum seekers
is difficult for at least two reasons. First, there is a measurement problem, because general
population surveys often do not measure whether immigrants first entered the country as asylum
seekers or under another immigration status. Second, it is challenging to empirically isolate the
causal effects of employment bans, because countries that impose waiting periods of different
lengths also differ on many other confounding factors that can impact refugee employment. And
even if the comparison is limited to refugees who are affected by changes in the length of an
employment ban within the same country, one might worry that such changes are endogenous to
changes in the local labor market conditions. For example, a country might introduce or extend
an employment ban because labor market conditions are deteriorating.
In this study we take a first step toward generating causal evidence on the effects of employ-
ment bans on refugee integration. In particular, we examine the short- and long-term effects of
such employment bans on the economic integration of refugees. We draw on a case study in
Germany, a country that has been a major European destination country for refugees in the past
decades, including refugees during the Yugoslavian wars in the nineties and the present refugee
crisis stemming from violence in the Middle East and Africa (13).
To address the causal identification problem, our study design leverages a natural experi-
ment. On March 22, 2000 a court ruling prompted the German government to change the em-
ployment ban for asylum seekers from indefinite to twelve months, thereby creating exogenous
variation in the amount of time asylum seekers from different arrival cohorts had to wait before
they could enter the German labour market. To address the measurement problem, we draw on
the 2000-2014 waves of the German Mikrozensus. Each wave is a representative annual survey
that covers 1% of the resident population. We focus on the group of immigrants from the former
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) who arrived in Germany in 1999 and 2000 (14). Even
though the Mikrozensus does not measure asylum-seeker status upon arrival, we can establish
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based on register data that the overwhelming majority of immigrants who arrived in Germany
during those years from the FRY were asylum seekers who were fleeing because of the Kosovo
war.
To identify the effects of the length of the waiting period we compare the cohorts of FRY
asylum seekers who arrived in Germany in 1999 and 2000, respectively. These cohorts faced
very different wait times, because the new, 12-month waiting period went into effect on Decem-
ber 15, 2000. Importantly, this new rule was also applied to asylum seekers who had arrived
before December 15, 2000. Therefore, all refugees who entered in 2000 had to wait 12 months
from their date of arrival before they were allowed to enter the German labor market. By con-
trast, refugees who entered in 1999 had to wait between 13 and 24 months, depending on when
in 1999 they had arrived. For example, a refugee who had arrived in January 1999 had to wait
24 months while a refugee who had arrived in December 1999 only had to wait 13 months. On
average, refugees in the 1999 cohort had to wait 7.1 months longer than the 2000 cohort (see
the Supplementary Materials for details). As we show below, these two arrival cohorts were
otherwise similar across many characteristics, allowing us to isolate the short- and long-term
effects of the differences in the length of the waiting period on the economic integration of the
refugees. In addition, we use various placebo checks with the FRY refugees and other immi-
grant groups to rule out alternative explanations. Details about the measures, sample, design,
and statistical analysis can be found in the Materials and Methods section.
Results
Figure 2, Panel A shows the estimated employment rates of both cohorts of FRY refugees
who arrived in Germany in 1999 and 2000, respectively. We find that the 1999 cohort, which
faced on average 7.1 months of additional wait time, experienced much lower employment rates
compared to the 2000 cohort for many years following the reduction of the employment ban in
6
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Figure 2: Longer employment bans worsen employment trajectories of refugees. Panel A
shows the employment trajectories of FRY refugees who arrived in Germany in 1999 (in green)
and in 2000 (in red), (n = 1, 748). The 1999 arrival cohort faced a 13–24-month employment
ban (depending on their month of arrival), while the 2000 arrival cohort faced a 12-months
employment ban. The average difference in the length of the waiting period between the 1999
and 2000 cohort is 7.1 months. The dots indicate the percentage of respondents who are in paid
employment by survey year. The curved regression lines and corresponding 95% confidence
intervals are a non-parametric approximation of the employment trajectories using regression
B-splines. Panel B shows the results of the first placebo test: Turkish immigrants who arrived in
1999 and 2000 but were not subject to the ban experienced very similar employment trajectories
(n = 3, 712). Panel C shows the results of the second placebo test: FRY refugees who arrived
in 2000 and 2001 and were subject to the same 12-month waiting period experienced virtually
identical employment trajectories (n = 1, 067).
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2000. While both cohorts start out with similarly low employment rates in 2001, the year they
were allowed to enter the German labour market, the 2000 cohort finds work much faster over
the following years, while the employment growth among the 1999 cohort considerably lags
behind. By 2005, five years after the ban is reduced, we find that the employment rates among
the 1999 cohort is only 29% compared to 49% among the the 2000 cohort. This 20 percentage
points gap in employment amounts to about a 67% difference compared to the employment rate
among the 1990 cohort. After 2005 the gap starts to narrow, but it is not until 2010, about ten
years after the ban was reduced, that the 1999 cohort catches up to the employment rate of the
2000 cohort.
One concern with the previous results might be that FRY refugees in the 1999 arrival cohort
differ from the FRY refugees in the 2000 arrival cohort in important confounding characteristics
that could explain the considerable gap in employment. This seems unlikely for various reasons.
First, balance checks show that the two cohorts exhibit no discernible differences in terms of
many demographic characteristics, such as age at arrival, gender, and education level, as well as
in their answers to health-related survey items. The only exception to this are some imbalances
that appear in the first Mikrozensus wave in 2000. Refugees arrived throughout that year, but
the Mikrozensus was fielded in May, so the 2000 arrival cohort was only partially covered (for
details see SM Section 3.1). We exclude the 2000 wave from the statistical models below
and focus on the post 2000 period when both arrival cohorts were covered. There are also no
discernible differences in terms of the propensity to leave Germany. If that were the case, we
would expect the sample composition to shift over time. However, the relative sampling fraction
of each cohort is fairly constant across waves (see SM Section 3.2).
Second, one potentially important difference between the two cohorts is that the 1999 cohort
has one additional year of residency in Germany compared to the 2000 cohort. This should, if
anything, bias the comparison against finding a negative effect of the longer waiting period, be-
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cause much research has shown that years of residency in the host country is one of the strongest
predictors of economic integration (15–17). Given that the 1999 cohort had one additional year
to acquire local knowledge about Germany, learn the language, build networks, and search for
opportunities, these refugees should have enjoyed a considerable advantage over those who had
just arrived.
Third, if there exists a confounding characteristic that is associated with lower employment
for immigrants who arrived in 1999 compared to 2000 (such as long-term consequences of
differences in initial economic conditions), we would expect that confounder also to operate
on groups who did not enter as refugees and are therefore unaffected by the employment ban.
Figure 1, Panel B shows the results of a placebo check that rules out this possibility. Leveraging
Turkish immigrants who arrived in Germany in 1999 and 2000, most of whom were not asylum
seekers and or refugees and so were unaffected by the policy change, we find no discernible
difference in the employment rates of these Turkish arrival cohorts.
In addition, Figure 1, Panel C shows that there are also no discernible differences between
the employment trajectories of FRY refugees who arrived in 2000 and 2001, respectively, and
were subject to the same 12-month ban. This suggests that in the absence of changes in the
length of the waiting period, there are no confounders that independently caused a gap in em-
ployment rates between subsequent cohorts, let alone a gap of the magnitude as large as the
one we find for the 1999 and 2000 FRY refugee cohort. Taken together, these additional tests
suggest that it is unlikely that the long-term employment effects of the ban we find are driven
by differences in unobserved confounders.
The blue line in Figure 3 shows the estimated effects of the 7.1-months-longer average
waiting period on the probability of employment for the first sixteen years after arrival. These
estimates are based on a statistical model where we pool the data of both the 1999 and 2000
FRY refugee arrival cohorts across all survey waves starting in 2001 and regress the employment
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outcome on an indicator for the 1999 and 2000 arrival cohort, the years of residency, and the
interaction of the two. The model also includes a full set of survey waves fixed effects, as
well as the covariates age, gender, and schooling. The 7 months of additional waiting had a
considerably negative short- and long-term impact on the employment of refugees. In particular,
it takes up to ten years until the 1999 cohort recovers from the longer employment ban and is
able to close the gap with the 2000 cohort. The red estimates suggest that these findings are
very similar when we relax the linearity assumption on the interaction effect and utilize a binned
interaction model (see SM Section 3.3 for details).
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Figure 3: Short- and long-term effects of on average 7 additional months of employment
ban on refugee employment. The Figure shows the effect of an on average 7-month longer
employment ban on the probability that refugees are employed in years one to sixteen after
their arrival in Germany. The blue line shows the point estimates from the linear interaction
effect model with corresponding 95% confidence interval (n = 1, 645). Red point estimates
and corresponding 95% confidence intervals show the corresponding effect sizes for a binning
specification that relaxes the linear interaction effect assumption and estimates the effect at the
median of each tercile of the length-of-residency variable.
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Discussion
In this study we have provided the first evidence on the short- and long-term effects of employ-
ment bans on the subsequent employment rates of refugees, a critical aspect of their economic
integration. Leveraging a natural experiment in Germany that provided exogenous variation in
the length of the employment ban imposed on refugee cohorts from FRY, we find that longer
employment bans had severe negative and long-lasting consequences for subsequent employ-
ment. The average seven months of additional waiting reduced employment for up to ten years
after the ban expired, considerably delaying the economic integration of refugees. Consistent
with this we also find a reduction in personal income (see SM section 3.5 for details).
What mechanism might explain these effects of the longer waiting period? While the sam-
ple size limits us in answering this question definitively, additional analysis suggests that the
longer waiting period considerably reduced refugees’ efforts to find work when the ban finally
lifted. Noting that the 1999 cohort exhibits lower employment levels than the 2000 cohort, we
would, ceteris paribus, expect them to search more intensively for jobs. However, unemployed
respondents who arrived in 1999 were much less likely than the 2000 cohort to search for a job
during the 3 weeks before each survey wave (see SM Section 3.4 for details). This difference in
search effort is consistent with the idea that the effect of longer waiting periods could be driven
by reducing refugees’ motivation to find work.
Our study has important implications for theory and policy. For theory, our findings are
consistent with and contribute to the literature on the “scar” effects of unemployment (18–20).
The results show that the long-term negative consequences of forced unemployment are partic-
ularly pronounced for refugees, a highly vulnerable population of individuals who often arrive
in the host country without any resources and being traumatized from having fled violence and
war. Furthermore, the findings point to the existence of an influential early integration win-
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dow. In other words, the initial period after arrival is highly consequential for the subsequent
integration trajectory of refugees, and early investments yield disproportionate integration re-
turns (17,21, 22).
Our findings also have implications for policymakers struggling with the integration of
refugees in Europe. By depressing refugees’ employment rates for many years after arrival, em-
ployment bans not only adversely affect the well-being of refugees, they also impose significant
costs on the host country’s economy. Refugees who struggle to find employment require in-
creased public expenditures for welfare and make lower tax contributions. Our simple marginal
social cost analysis indicates that reducing the employment ban for all 40,500 FRY refugees
who arrived in 1999 by seven months would have led to annual savings of about 40 million
Euros in unspent monthly welfare transfers for unemployed refugees and unearned tax and wel-
fare contributions from employed refugees (see SM Section 3.7 for details). This implies total
marginal costs of about 370 million Euros over the 2001 to 2009 period for FRY refugees alone.
These are substantial costs for a policy with uncertain returns in light of the empirical evidence,
which suggests that refugee employment has no consistent effects on depressing the wages or
employment rates of natives (23,24).
More generally, the negative effects of the longer employment ban point to a broader para-
dox in the unintended consequences of the European asylum regime. Governments need to
honor their legal commitments under the Geneva Convention to provide effective humanitarian
protection for refugees. Still, they tend to prohibit newly arrived asylum seekers from accessing
the host country’s labor market, to facilitate their removal if their asylum claims are rejected.
But at the same time, these initial restrictions severely slow down the economic integration of
the asylum seekers who are accepted, many of whom stay in the host country indefinitely (25).
Therefore, even though the policy of restricting initial access might pay short term political
dividends, it backfires in the long run: governments find themselves stuck with the long-term
12
costs of supporting refugees with low rates of economic integration and punished by the public
backlash associated with these integration failures.
Materials and Methods
Our statistical analysis is based on the 2000-2014 waves of the German Mikrozensus, a represen-
tative annual household survey that is conducted by the Federal Statistical Office of Germany.
Each year a random sample of 1% of all private households are surveyed which results in an-
nual samples of about 800,000 individuals. Individuals in collective dwellings, such as asylum
seeker shelters, are included in the target population. Selected respondents are required by law
to participate in the survey. While the Mikrozensus provides no interpreters for the interviews,
the respondents can switch to English as well as consult with other household members. The
legal duty to respond lies with the respondent and therefore they are required to find the help
they need to respond to the survey questions.
Our main study sample consists of immigrants who arrived in Germany from the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia as adults (at least 18 years old) in 1999 and 2000 and that have been
surveyed by the Mikrozensus. Yugoslavian immigrants are defined as individuals who report
holding or having held a citizenship from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, Montenegro, the
Republic of Kosovo and/or the Republic of Serbia. We selected this group for two reasons. First,
the large majority of immigrants who arrived from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during
this time period entered Germany as asylum seekers. Second, this group has a sufficient number
of arrivals such that we can measure the effects of the employment ban using the annual German
Mikrozensus. While there are other data sources in Germany that contain samples of (former)
asylum seekers from our study period (such as the Socio-Economic Panel or Stichprobe der
Integrierten Erwerbsbiografien), the Mikrozensus is the only data source in Germany that has a
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sufficient number of cases and contains information on immigrants’ year of arrival.
Our use of the Mikrozensus data was governed by a data use agreement with the Federal
Statistical Office and did not require informed consent and institutional review board approval,
given the nature of the data. We were granted permission to analyze the data, but the data itself
was not transferred to us. Instead, we developed code files based on mock data and sent these
code files to the staff of the Mikrozensus who executed the code in a secure data facility and
returns the results to us. The staff returned only those results that met the legal confidential
criteria. All our replication code is posted in a dataverse at doi:10.7910/DVN/TZCJ83.
To estimate the effect of the difference in the waiting period that was caused by the changes
in the employment ban, we compare respondents who arrived in 1999 and 2000. This informa-
tion is encoded in the respondents’ answer to a question about their year of arrival in Germany
(the arrival month is not available in the data). We cannot distinguish between those that entered
Germany as asylum seekers and entered with, for example, a work visa. Thus, all our estimates
are intention-to-treat effects (ITT) which could be interpreted as lower-bound estimates of the
local average treatment effects. We measure the employment status of a respondent using a
variable that is consistently available across survey years and encodes if a person is employed
or (in)voluntary unemployed in the survey week. Our identifying assumption is that, controlling
for the covariates, the cohorts do not differ systematically in attributes other than the waiting
period that also affect their employment status. We conducted a series of placebo and balance
checks that lend credibility to this assumption.
Our baseline specification is a linear OLS regression model where we interact an indicator
for the cohort (Di; 1 if 2000 and 0 if 1999) with a measure of the length of residency (Ri). We
additionally include a series of control variables: age (continuous), schooling (binary), gender
(binary) and survey-wave fixed effects (collected in a matrix Xi). We cluster standard errors at
the household level. The linear interaction specification takes the following form:
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yi = β0 + β1Di + β2Ri + β3Ri ×Di +X′iγ + i (1)
Our central quantity of interest is β3 which identifies the differences in the employment rates
between the arrival cohorts conditional on a given number of years of residency.
As an additional check we also use a binning specification that adds another interaction
with an indicator for the length-of-residency variable’s tercile (Gji; short, medium, or long resi-
dency). With this specification we can estimate the conditional effect of the cohort indicator for
individuals that lived in the country for a short, medium and long period of time. The advantage
of this specification is that it doesn’t require to assume that the interaction effect between cohort
and the length of residency is linear. We again cluster standard errors on the household level for
this specification. The specification of the binning estimator takes the following form:
yi =
3∑
j=1
(
µj + αjDi + ηj(Ri − rj) + βj(Ri − rj)Di
)
Gij +X
′
iγ + i (2)
where rj is the median length of residency in the jth tercile and Gij an indicator if the ith
observation is in the jth tercile. Since (Ri − rj) equals zero when Ri = rj , the coefficients α1,
α2,α3 directly measure the conditional marginal effect of Di on yi at the median in each tercile.
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Supplementary Materials and Methods
Background on Kosovo Refugee Crisis
The Kosovo war took place between 1998 and 1999. Before the war, the Kosovo region was
part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). In the mid 1990s, the Kosovo Liberation
Army began an insurgency against the central government with a series of attacks against Ser-
bian installations. In early 1998, the conflict escalated to a full scale civil war, civilian casualties
increased and Kosovar Albanians and others fled from the Kosovo region. After a diplomatic
solution failed, the NATO launched a comprehensive air bombardment campaign on all Yu-
goslavian military installations in 1999, which led to more people fleeing from the region.
Data from the UNHCR suggests that most of those who fled from the Kosovo war sought
asylum in Western European countries, and in particular in Germany. Table 1 shows the number
of asylum applications from the FRY in Western Europe and Germany as well as the share of
Kosovo Albanians, respectively. These numbers exclude applications that re-filed after an ini-
tial rejection. Note that the data for the share of Kosovo Albanians is based on self-reports by
the asylum seekers and therefore might be affected by strategic misreporting of ethnicity. In ad-
dition, it appears that the ethnicity classification was revised in 1999 which might compromise
the comparability across years.
Table 2 shows the number of asylum seekers arriving in Germany from the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia as measured by German registry data (Ausla¨nderzentralregister). These data have
been requested by the authors from the Federal Statistical Office of Germany via its public
information service. Note that these numbers do not exactly match those from the UNHCR in
Table 1 since they refer to individuals and not to applications. We see that the large majority of
persons from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia who arrived during 1998 to 2001 were asylum
seekers and refugees. An asylum seeker is an individual who filed an application for asylum.
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Asylum Applications from Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Number of Applications % of Applications
Year West Europe Germany Germany Kosovo Albanians
1998 88,236 34,979 42% 88%
1999 119,060 31,450 28% 66%
2000 46,495 11,121 25% 34%
2001 29,497 7,758 28% 40%
Table 1: Asylum Applications from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Europe and
Germany. Table shows the number of initial asylum-application submissions in Europe and
West Germany. The second to last column shows the share of applications filed in Germany
and the last column shows the share of applications filed by Kosovo Albanians in Germany.
Source: (26–29)
A refugee is an individual whose application for asylum has been successful and who receives
some form of (temporary) protection.
Asylum seekers
Year All Arrivals and Refugees in %
1998 37,047 32,871 89
1999 48,506 40,501 83
2000 14,639 11,249 77
2001 10,640 6,421 60
Table 2: Arrivals from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Germany. Table shows the
annual number of arrivals from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as well as the number of
asylum seekers and refugees (based on the legal status (Aufenthaltsstatus) as of December 31 of
the arrival year; asylum seekers and refugees are individuals who held a Aufenthaltsgestattung
or a Duldung). Source: Ausla¨nderzentralregister Deutschland, 2015.
Labor Market Access of Asylum Seekers in Germany
Before January 1, 2001, access to the German labor market was severely restricted for asylum
seekers and refugees. Asylum seekers, refugees with subsidiary protection, and most refugees
with temporary asylum had to apply for a job-specific work permit (Allgemeine Arbeitserlaub-
nis) with the German labor market agencies. By law a work permit could be granted only if no
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German with the same qualifications was available to fill the vacancy (Vorrangpru¨fung). The
small group of refugees who were granted full asylum under the Geneva convention had full
access to the labor market via a special work permit (Besondere Arbeitserlaubnis), but this is
not relevant for our sample of FRY refugees who were not granted full asylum.
In May 1993, the Minister for Work, Norbert Blu¨m, issued a set of rules that stipulated
that employers had to justify in great detail why they rejected an application by a German and
instead preferred to hire a foreigner. In June 6, 1997 these rules were further tightened by the
head of the labor market regulation unit in the Ministry for Work, Peter Clever, who instructed
all local branches to not issue any work permits to asylum-applicants or anyone eligible for
temporary protection who arrived in Germany after May 15, 1997. Clever’s directive came to
be known as the Clever Erlass (30).
In March 22, 2000, a court effectively declared the Clever Erlass illegal (Sozialgericht
Lu¨beck, 2. Kammer, Az.: S 2 AL 8/99) and the government issued a new legislative regulation
in September 2000, the so-called Riester Verordnung named after the new Minister of Labour
and Social Affairs Walter Riester. The Riester Verordnung came into effect on December 15,
2000. Under this new regulation asylum seekers could apply for a work permit 12 months after
their arrival date and those who had been granted asylum could enter the labor immediately.
Importantly, the new rule was retroactively applied to asylum seekers who had arrived before
December 15, 2000 (31,32).
Figure 4 illustrates the effect of the regulatory switch from the Clever Erlass to the Riester
Verordnung on the mandatory waiting period as a function of the arrival months between 1999
and 2000. As is evident in Figure 4, the asylum seekers who arrived in Germany in 1999 and
2000 faced very different wait times, because of the new, 12-month waiting period that went
into effect on December 15, 2000. All those who entered in 2000 had to wait 12 months from
their date of arrival before they were allowed to enter the German labor market. By contrast,
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Figure 4: Illustration of the waiting period as a function of the arrival month.
those who entered in 1999 had to wait between 13 and 24 months, depending on when in 1999
they had arrived. For example, somebody who had arrived in January 1999 had to wait 24
months while somebody who had arrived in December 1999 only had to wait 13 months.
Based on monthly data about the number of asylum applications from the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (33,34), we estimated that the average waiting time for the 1999 arrival cohort was
about 19 months while it was 12 month for the 2000 arrival cohort. The average difference in
the length of the waiting period between the 1999 and 2000 cohort was 7.1 months. Since there
is a lag between the month of arrival and the month of applying for asylum (due to bureaucratic
backlog), this estimate is approximate.
Variable Dictionary
Table 3 lists all the variables used in the analysis.
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Variable Description
Cohort Year of arrival (1999 = 0, 2000 = 1)
Length of residency Survey year - year of arrival
Employed 1 if employed (Erwerbsta¨tiger); 0 otherwise
Age Age
Gender Gender
Schooling 1 if at least lower tier education (Hauptschulabschluss); 0 otherwise
Table 3: List of Variables
Descriptive Statistics
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics for the main study sample and Table 5 the descriptive
statistics for the male study sample.
Variable Mean SD
Cohort 0.37 0.48
Length of residency 8.80 4.09
Employed 0.49 0.50
Age 38.98 10.83
Gender 0.54 0.50
Schooling 0.76 0.43
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for the main study sample (n = 1, 645).
Variable Mean SD
Cohort 0.38 0.49
Length of residency 8.89 4.10
Employed 0.66 0.47
Age 38.73 10.21
Schooling 0.82 0.38
Table 5: Descriptive statistics for the male study sample (n = 749).
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Further Results
Balance Tests
Figure 5 reports covariate-by-covariate balance checks comparing the background character-
istics of the 1999 and 2000 FRY refugee arrival cohorts. We find that the two cohorts are
statistically indistinguishable on all background covariates. The only exception to this are some
imbalances that occur in the first survey year in 2000. In this survey year, respondents arriving
in 2000 tend to be younger and are less likely to have primary school education. This imbalance
is most likely due to the fact that the 2000 arrival cohort is only partially covered in the 2000
Mikrozensus wave. This is because refugees were arriving throughout that year, but the field
period for the 2000 Mikrozensus survey was only between May 8th, 2000 and May 14th, 2000.
Therefore the 2000 Mikrozensus missed all of the refugees who arrived after May 14, 2000. In
contrast, by 2001, all refugees of the 2000 cohort had arrived and were likely included in the
target population of the Mikrozensus and accordingly the balance in the covariates is restored
when we compare the 1999 and 2000 arrival cohorts in the 2001 survey and all following survey
waves.
The implication of this incomplete coverage in 2000 for the 2000 arrival cohort is that for
this particular survey year, the comparison might well be confounded, but this issue should not
affect our inference for the following survey years which are the core focus of our study. In
fact, all analyses except Figure 1 (the raw means) and the balance checks exclude the survey
year 2000 given that our inferences about the effects of the employment ban focus on the post
2000 period.
In addition, we checked whether the cohorts differ in terms of reported health problems.
Across all survey waves, none of the 2000 arrivals reported severe health problems and of the
1999 arrivals only six respondents (1%) reported severe health problems.
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Figure 5: Balance Checks for 1999 versus 2000 FRY Arrival Cohort. Each panel shows
the difference-in-means estimate for a specific covariate with a 95% confidence interval (based
on standard errors clustered at the household) for each survey-year for the main study sample.
The last estimate to the right is the difference-in-means estimate pooled across all survey waves
estimated with a regression of the covariate on a cohort indicator and survey-year fixed-effects.
Covariate definitions: Age is a continuous variable measuring the age of a respondent in a sur-
vey year, Age (30-50) indicates if a respondent is between 30-50 years old, Age (<=30)
indicates if a respondents is at most 30 years old, Primary edu. indicates if a respondent has
at least a lower tier eduction (Haupt(Volks)schulabschluss) and Secondary edu indicates if
a respondents has at least a middle tier education (Realschulabschluss).23
Attrition Check
Figure 6 examines the sampling probabilities for the 1999 and 2000 arrival cohorts in each
survey wave by showing the fraction of the pooled sample that is from the 1999 arrival cohort.
The sample composition remains fairly constant over time which indicates that there are no
discernible differences between the 1999 and the 2000 cohort in terms of the propensity to
leave Germany. If one cohort were more likely to emigrate the fraction of that cohort would
be expected to decline over time as the Mikrozensus is based on a representative sample of the
resident population.
Note again that the exception to the pattern is the 2000 survey wave, where the 2000 arrival
cohort has a relatively lower sampling rate due to the incomplete coverage of asylum seekers
who arrived in 2000 but after the Mikrozensus fieldwork for that year had been completed.
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Figure 6: Sampling Probabilities for Arrival Cohorts by Year. Shows the proportion of
1999 arrivals in the pooled 1999/2000 arrivals Mikrozensus sample in each survey year for
respondents from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
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Effect Estimates from Linear Interaction and Binning Specification
Table 6 shows the effects of the longer employment ban on refugee employment based on
the linear interaction specifications. These estimates correspond to the marginal effect line
shown in Figure 1 in the main text. Table 7 shows the corresponding effects from the binning
specification. These estimates correspond to the dots shown in Figure 1 in the main text.
Years of Residency Marginal Effect Standard Error
1 0.10 0.050
3 0.10 0.040
5 0.09 0.032
7 0.08 0.026
9 0.07 0.024
11 0.07 0.027
13 0.06 0.034
15 0.05 0.043
Table 6: Estimated Difference in Employment Rates between 1999 and 2000 cohort by
Years of Residency. Shows the estimated marginal effects of the cohort indicator for vari-
ous levels of length of residency based on the linear interaction specifications as described in
equation 1 (n = 1, 645).
Years of Residency Marginal Effect Standard Error
4 0.15 0.045
9 -0.01 0.051
13 0.07 0.040
Table 7: Estimated Difference in Employment Rates between 1999 and 2000 cohort by
Years of Residency. Shows the estimated marginal effects of the cohort indicator for three
length of residencies based on the binning specifications as described in equation 2 (n = 1, 645).
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Effect of Employment Ban on Search Effort
Table 8 shows the effects of the employment ban on the search effort as measured by a question
about whether unemployed respondents are reporting that they are actively searching for a job
or not in the last 3 weeks before the survey. We regress this indicator for active search on the
cohort indicator plus survey-wave fixed effects and the baseline model covariates (gender, age,
schooling).
We find that unemployed respondents from the 2000 cohort that faced a shorter waiting
period had about a 7 to 9 percentage point higher probability of searching for a job according
to the pooled estimates. The estimates broken down by two-year intervals are more noisy and
generally positive but insignificant. The sample sizes are also smaller since the models are only
fitted to unemployed respondents.
2001-03 2004-06 2007-09 2001-09 2001-09
Cohort 0.06 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.08
(0.076) (0.089) (0.079) (0.046) (0.043)
Constant 0.23 0.14 0.18 0.22 0.74
(0.058) (0.055) (0.067) (0.056) (0.106)
Survey FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates No No No No Yes
N 222 149 173 544 544
Table 8: Effect of Employment Ban on Search Effort. Shows coefficients and household-
clustered standard error in parentheses. The outcome variable is an indicator for whether un-
employed respondents are reporting that they are actively searching for a job or not in the last 3
weeks before the survey. Covariates include gender, age and schooling.
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Subsample Analysis: Male Respondents
Figure 7 shows the replication of Figure 3 in the main text for male respondents only. The results
are fairly similar to the overall sample but less precisely estimated given the lower sample size.
Table 9 shows the corresponding effect estimates from the linear interaction specification and
Table 10 shows the corresponding effect estimates from the binning specification.
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Figure 7: Short- and long-term effects of on average 7 additional months of employment
ban on refugee employment. (Male Respondents). The Figure shows the effect of an on
average 7-month longer employment ban on the probability that refugees are employed in years
one to sixteen after their arrival in Germany. The blue line shows the point estimates from the
linear interaction effect model with corresponding 95% confidence interval (n = 749) . Red
point estimates and corresponding 95% confidence intervals show the corresponding effect sizes
for a binning specification that relaxes the linear interaction effect assumption and estimates the
effect at the median of each tercile of the length-of-residency variable.
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Years of Residency Marginal Effect Standard Error
1 0.16 0.078
3 0.14 0.063
5 0.11 0.050
7 0.08 0.039
9 0.05 0.034
11 0.03 0.036
13 0.00 0.046
15 -0.03 0.059
Table 9: Estimated Difference in Employment Rates between 1999 and 2000 cohort by
Years of Residency. Shows the estimated marginal effects of the cohort indicator for vari-
ous levels of length of residency based on the linear interaction specifications as described in
equation 1 (male respondents only, n = 749).
Years of Residency Marginal Effect Standard Error
4 0.18 0.067
9 0.02 0.057
13 -0.01 0.058
Table 10: Estimated Difference in Employment Rates between 1999 and 2000 cohort by
Years of Residency. Shows the estimated marginal effects of the cohort indicator for three
length of residencies based on the binning specifications as described in equation 2 (male re-
spondents only, n = 749).
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Effect on Reported Income
Figure 8 shows the replication of Figure 3 in the main text but using reported monthly net
personal income (earned income and welfare transfers as an outcome variable. Unfortunately,
the Mikrozensus does not include a variable that allows us to consistently separate between
monthly earned income and welfare transfers. Note that unemployed asylum seekers eventually
become eligible for welfare benefits and therefore they will report income from these transfers
which will reduce income difference between employed and unemployed respondents.
The results suggest that about four years after arrival, the 2000 arrival cohort that faced a
shorter ban has on average a higher reported monthly income (about 200 Euros) than the arrival
1999 cohort. This is a 27 percentage increase over the average income for the 1999 arrivals in
their fourth year after arrival. The effect is about 100 Euros larger for the men-only sample.
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Figure 8: Short- and long-term effects of on average 7 additional months of employment
ban on monthly net personal income. The Figure shows the effect of an on average 7-month
longer employment ban on the reported monthly personal income (in Euro) in years one to
sixteen after their arrival in Germany (full sample, n = 1, 645, male respondents only, n =
749). The blue line shows the point estimates from the linear interaction effect model with
corresponding 95% confidence interval. Red point estimates and corresponding 95% confidence
intervals show the corresponding effect sizes for a binning specification that relaxes the linear
interaction effect assumption and estimates the effect at the median of each tercile of the length-
of-residency variable.
30
Social Cost Analysis
Our approach is as follows: Using the estimated effect of the employment ban, we estimate
the total number of additional employed asylum seekers in the absence of the employment ban
among the 40,500 Yugoslavians who arrived in Germany in 1999. Each of these additional jobs
saves the tax payer welfare benefits and creates revenue in the form of additional tax contribu-
tions on a monthly basis. We estimate the size of the saved welfare benefits using the reported
average monthly personal income for the group of unemployed Yugoslavians in each Mikrozen-
sus wave. We use the the reported average monthly personal income for those that are employed
and the annual standard gross tax rate for a family with 2 children to estimate the additional tax
contributions. The reported personal income is the only variable that is consistently available in
the Mikrozensus to make these calculation.
The calculation for the tax payer’s savings in a calendar year t can be expressed as a formula
as follows:
12× (ban effectt × cohort size)︸ ︷︷ ︸
additional employed
(
(tax ratet × incomet)︸ ︷︷ ︸
tax contributiont
+ unspent welfaret
)
.
The 40,8 Million Euro we report in the main text is the average of the estimates for each
calendar year between 2001 and 2009.
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To illustrate the calculation, we use the data for 2006. We estimate that in 2006, a ban
reduced the chances for employment by about 10 percentage points. This implies that in the
absence of a ban we would expect about an 4,000 additional employed. The average reported
monthly personal income for unemployed respondents is about 450 Euros while the reported
personal income (after taxes) for an employed responded is about 1,100 Euros. The gross annual
tax rate for a family with 2 children is about 25%.
When we plug in these values into the formula, we obtain an estimate about how much the
German tax payer could have saved in 2006:
12× (0.10× 40500)(((1100/(1− 0.25))− 1100) + 450) = 39.7 Million Euro.
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